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Brian Easton* 
The Woodhouse Report provides an instructive model for effective advocacy, in that its 
proposals aimed to solve a clearly defined social problem: meeting the needs of accident victims in 
an equitable and comprehensive fashion.  Moreover the Report presented its solution as a cost-
effective way of meeting broader compensation needs, by making existing economic resources go 
further.  This paper argues that the Woodhouse model achieved success largely because of its 
problem-based clarity and sensitivity to cost efficiency.  It also places the Woodhouse treatment of 
personal injury litigation in a larger historical pattern of evolution in common law. 
Although it is rarely presented this way, policy making is a problem solving exercise. At the 
heart of the success of any solution is how well the problem is addressed.1 This approach, analogous 
to Karl Popper's approach to the development of science, requires us to be "as clear as you can about 
the problem, and watch the way it changes".2 A task then, of an historian, is to identify the problem 
or problems which drove a solution. 
I THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE PRACTICE OF COMPENSATION  
The principle of compensation for personal injury seems to have arisen in Europe as a means of 
offsetting retribution by the injured and their families. As J G Fleming, who was cited by the 
Woodhouse Commission, comments:3 
At the dawn of common law and for long thereafter, crime and tort covered much the same ground, both 
stemming from a common desire for vengeance and deterrence and distinguishable only by the nature of 
their respective sanctions ... [t]ort liability ... provided a means whereby the victim could be "bribed" 
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into abstaining from retaliation by being able to compel the perpetrator to render him monetary 
compensation for the wrong. 
In pre-industrial societies this was probably a rough and ready solution to a practical problem. 
The Maori had a similar principle of utu.4 No doubt many minor infringements in European life 
were dealt with by an informal utu-like process within the community, but the existence of the 
supreme authority of law limited the grievance process to creating the further retaliation in which 
Maoridom got bogged down on occasions. 
However these solutions to the problem of how to limit vengeance and deter injury proved 
inadequate in the industrial society. Communities were broken up and interactions – and the 
possibility of injury – between strangers became more common. The breakdown of feudal and 
quasi-feudal relations changed the obligations of employers towards employees. New production 
processes (including new modes of transport) generated greater possibilities of accidents both in 
terms of number and degree of injury. Perhaps too, as life lengthened and expectations of an after-
life shortened, the importance of fair resolutions became a matter of concern. 
From the nineteenth century British common law attempted to cope with the new circumstances 
by breaking the narrow compass within which the embryonic law of negligence had been gestating, 
extending it beyond the time hallowed consensual relations of doctor and patient (and so forth) into 
a vast range of informal situations symbolised by collisions at intersections or level crossings, open 
coal chutes in public streets, and bags of flour dropping from warehouses on passing pedestrians.5 
But common law extensions proved inadequate, especially for factory injuries. A notable failure 
was the "fellow-servant rule" usually ascribed to Lord Abingner's opinion in Priestley v Fowler in 
1837, who held that in employment relationships of tradesmen the servant had no cause of action 
following an employment accident.6 The opinion, described as "diffuse and unperceptive", seems 
more an eighteenth century concern about the disruptive effects of a master's liability upon his 
household staff, than a recognition of looming nineteenth century industrial realities.7 
The "doctrine of common employment" was put on a more rigorous basis by Chief Justice Shaw 
of Massachusetts in 1844 who observed there was a contract between employer and employee 
which did not usually mention indemnification for injury from industrial accidents (whereas there 
was no such formal contract between an employer and the public).8 The notion was that an 
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employee took into consideration the risk of industrial accident when he or she entered into the 
employment contract, and the remuneration included that. (Presumably the employee could use 
some of the remuneration to purchase insurance, although of course few did).9 
Whatever the technical underpinning, it was not a particularly realistic account of the situation 
in a large industrial establishment where "a servant has as little opportunity of guarding against 
negligence of many of his fellow servants as a member of the public; and he could hardly be said to 
have consented to abide risks of which he had neither knowledge nor means of knowledge". W S 
Holdsworth goes on that "[t]he limitation thus imposed on the liability of employers was far too 
strict – a truth which is emphasised by the fact that no other country in Europe has adopted any 
similar doctrine".10 
Thus statute law began to take a role, probably beginning with the British Fatal Accidents Act 
1846, which was imported into New Zealand law via the English Acts Act 1854.11 Bismark's 
Germany enacted statutory protection for workers in 1884, and a decade later the British Parliament 
passed the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 with New Zealand following with the Worker's 
Compensation Act 1900. As J W McDonald shrewdly observes of the British statute:12 
It was immediately occasioned by the agitation in respect of the question of contracting out, but the true 
foundation of the measure is found in the development of the industrial system and the inadequacy of 
the common law and existing statutory law to deal with the problems, social and economic, which the 
system brought in its train. 
A third statutory strand was the Social Security Act 1938, which provided benefits for those 
who were sick or ill, the effect of which was to provide a minimum level of income for those who 
were injured. Unlike workers' compensation that income was not earnings related, and there was no 
compensation where a person returned to work even though their earning capacity and enjoyment of 
life had been diminished. 
The ACC, based on a contributory scheme providing earnings related benefits, sits uneasily 
beside the social security system funded from general taxation with flat rate benefits. The best 
opportunity to integrate collapsed with the revocation of the Third Labour Government's New 
Zealand Superannuation Scheme, with its first tier social security based, and a second tier which 
was like ACC in that it was contributor and earnings related (although contribution determined). 
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Over the years the workers' compensation law was extended, but in principle it did not cover 
out-of-work incidents (although it was common to claim for out-of-work injuries as occurring on the 
work-site – most notably, given strenuous weekends, early on Monday mornings). By 1928 it 
became necessary to make statutory provision for another major source of injury, the motor vehicle, 
when New Zealand passed the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risk) Act 1928 which 
required vehicle owners to take out compulsory insurance to cover other people's injuries.13 
Any longer history would observe that there was a continuing refining of the common law and 
statutory coverage over the subsequent period. In 1956 there had been a consolidation of the 
Workers Compensation Act 1956, and in 1961 there had been a Committee of Inquiry into Absolute 
Liability. In 1966 the Government established a Royal Commission to inquire into and report upon 
Workers' Compensation. (The Criminal Compensation Act 1963 was also incorporated into the final 
scheme.) 
II THE PROBLEM THAT THE WOODHOUSE COMMISSION FACED 
Although the terms of reference of the Royal Commission are bland, its report opens with a 
feisty summary under the heading "The Problem":14 
One hundred thousand workers are injured in industrial accidents every year. By good fortune most 
escape with minor incapacities, but many are left with grievous personal problems … This is not all. 
The same work force must face the grave risks of the road and elsewhere during the rest of every 24 
hours … The toll of personal injury is one of the disastrous incidents of social progress, and the 
statistically inevitable victims are entitled to receive a co-ordinated response from the nation as a whole. 
They receive this only from the health service. For financial relief they must turn to three entirely 
different remedies, and frequently they are aided by none. 
The negligence action is a form of lottery. In the case of industrial accidents it provides inconsistent 
solutions for less than one victim in every hundred. The Workers' Compensation Act provides meagre 
compensation for workers, but only if their injury occurred at their work. The Social Security Act will 
assist with the pressing needs of those who remain, provided they can meet the means test. All others are 
left to fend for themselves. Such a fragmented and capricious response to a social problem which cries 
out for co-ordinated and comprehensive treatment cannot be good enough. No economic reason justifies 
it. It is a situation which needs to be changed. 
So the compensation problem has evolved somewhat from the medieval one of resolving 
vengeance and encouraging deterrence (although the Royal Commission was insistent that 
prevention was a part of its scheme's five principles). 
  
13  The details of these statutory developments are in Campbell above, Chapters 1 and 2. 
14  Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1967) [Woodhouse Report]. 
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE WOODHOUSE COMMISSION 211 
However there was one other problem which is not explicitly mentioned in the opening, but 
which was crucial to its resolution. Not only was the existing system fragmented and capricious, it 
was very expensive. The Royal Commission thought the administration expenses of the scheme 
were 42 per cent of the amount paid out in claims.15 It thought its proposed scheme could be run for 
11 per cent.16 That is an efficiency gain of over 20 per cent for the entire scheme. It used that gain 
to fund the comprehensive scheme – indeed had it not, the scheme could not have been as efficient. 
Of course those in the administration system, including lawyers, who were beneficiaries of the 
scheme would lose out, but the effect of the switching of transaction costs into transfers was to co-
opt the public and their representative lobbyists. (Not all lawyers opposed the scheme.) 
In the end this substantial efficiency gain made the revolutionary scheme possible. It also 
explains why it has never been possible to extend the scheme to sickness beneficiaries, despite the 
evident inequity between the difference of treating sickness victims by flat rate social security 
benefits and accident victims by earnings related accident compensation. 
There is simply no twenty per cent efficiency gain to fund a comprehensive sickness system. 
For completion it may be mentioned that the scheme as implemented addressed some other 
problems, most notably that of compensation for medical misadventure where the looming example 
of the United States tort practices – perhaps one could say "excesses" – were avoided by 
incorporating misadventure into the overall scheme. 
III THE FUTURE OF ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 
This paper is largely a retrospective account of the early history of the accident compensation 
scheme until 1967. Much has happened since. Is there anything we can learn from that history 
which might provide pointers for the future? The simplest message is that subsequent changes have 
not been as problem orientated as the Royal Commission's proposal was. 
Too often public policy debate, and even public policy development, is driven by solutions 
rather than problems, ignoring the wisdom "if it ain't broke, don't try to fix it". (The more cautious 
version is "if it ain't very broke, don't try to fix it".) Advocates are anxious to impose their policy 
answers to an issue, without any attention to what the problem might be. 
There are various covert reasons for solutions-driven policy. Much of recent change seems to 
have been driven by ideological objectives the reformers will not articulate because they knew they 
would be politically unacceptable, or by a Promethean insistence that the policy should conform to a 
particular "ideal" model. Sometimes the idealisation is riddled with nostalgia, with little attention to 
the historical facts, as for calls to return to common law for accident liability. The history of the 
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doctrine of common employment gives little comfort as to the efficacy of such a reversion. Indeed 
statutory protection was introduced because common law was not able to adapt fast enough. 
Moreover, as the Woodhouse proposals demonstrate, common law can have very high transaction 
costs. Even so, common law exists as a backup to statute law, and as illustrated by Ailsa Duffy's 
paper, where concerns are not adequately covered by statute law, it comes into its own – albeit 
clumsily.17 
Another common reason for hiding the true reasons for advocating a particular solution-driven 
policy, is that it is intended to redistribute income to the advocate and her or his employers, and 
away from others. That probably has been a major factor in recent changes. The clue that this is 
happening is when the rent-seekers claim unproven efficiency gains which are likely to be small in 
actuality, and never mention the redistributive impact which is likely to be large. Very often the 
advocation of solutions driven policy is bolstered by a list of pseudo-problems which have only a 
tenuous connection with any outcome the solution could deliver. 
This is not to say there is no case for carefully designed reforms based upon systematic analysis 
of a well defined problem. But typically any successful changes will be small and incremental rather 
than large and radical. Occasionally there will be reforms which are the latter. The Woodhouse 
proposal for compensation was one such example. Its success was based upon identifying a 
substantial efficiency gain and using the gain to co-opt a large proportion of the population to the 
reform. But it was founded on a clear understanding of the policy problem, based on analysis and a 
sensitivity to history. Instructively, it summarised the problem in a mere 250 words (including those 
outlined above). The summary gives no indication of what the solution might be, and so does not 
confuse them. 
If there is but one operational lesson in policy development from the Woodhouse Commission, 
it is to construct a problem summary. Others may not be able to be as clear and succinct, so let us 
give them the inefficiency margin which Woodhouse eliminated in the system of personal injury, 
and invite policy advocates to provide an account of the problem they are addressing (independent 
of the solution they seek) in, say, 320 words. Such a requirement would eliminate a lot of inefficient 
advocacy of solution-driven policy. 
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